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Modena-Kurpinsky: California Law Survey

SURVEY: WOMEN AND
CALIFORNIA LAW
This survey of California case law and legislation is a regular feature of the Women's Law Forum. The survey summarizes
recent California Supreme Court decisions, courts of appeal decisions, and new legislation which are of special importance to
women. The focus of the survey is on presenting issues most pertinent to women, rather than on analyzing all issues raised in
each case or bill.
The survey period for cases in this issue is March 1, 1981
through February 28, 1982. Summaries of significant legislation
enacted between October 1, 1980 and December 31, 1981 are also
included.
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1.

A.

CRIMINAL LAW
RAPE AND OTHER SEX OFFENSES

1.

Application of Statutory Rape Laws to Males

Michael M. v. Superior Court, 101 S. Ct. 1200 (1981), aff'g 25
Cal. 3d 608 (1979).
The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of California's statutory rape statute, Penal Code section 261.5,
which prohibits males from engaging in sexual intercourse with
females under the age of eighteen who are not their wives. The
Court reaffirmed previous holdings that gender-based classifications need only be substantially related to an important government interest to be valid. Using this test, the Court found that
California has an interest in preventing the drastic medical and
social costs accompanying teenage pregnancy. The statute was
found to provide a rational method to equalize the risks and respective costs of pregnancy.

The defendant, charged with violating section 261.5, sought
to set aside the information on the ground that the statute constituted unconstitutional gender discrimination. Both the trial
court and the court of appeal rejected the argumen,t. The California Supreme Court affirmed, holding this section did not violate equal protection requirements.
. The United State Supreme Court agreed with the California
courts, but not with their analysis. While California recognizes
gender classification as inherently suspect, the United States Supreme Court views sex classification cases as meriting only
'sharper focus.' This approach, first stated in Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976), requires that gender-based legislation be substantially related to an important government interest to be constitutionally valid.
The Court stated that a deterrent for males was necessary
to equalize the difference in cost reSUlting from underage sexual
activity between a male, who causes pregnancy, and a teenage
female, who bears the risks and responsibilities of pregnancy.
Thus, the section operated to put both sexes at parity and
achieved the legislative objective of preventing pregnancies that
would drastically affect underage females.
725
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Defendant also contended that a gender-neutral statute
would deter both sexes and eliminate any sex-based
discrimination.
The Court rejected this legislative rewrite, noting that
under Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), a legislature is not
required to delineate perfectly between the sexes. The court also
found a gender-neutral statute would defeat the state's objective
since females would be less likely to report offenses if they were
to be punished to the same extent as males.
Since the objective of section 261.5 is to prevent pregnancy,
the male also argued the statute was overbroad because it prohibited sexual relations with females too young to become pregnant. This argument was rejected as ridiculous because it would
inconsistently 8llow sexual intercourse with young girls, only to
punish it when they grew older.
A final argument theorized that the statute wrongly presumed males to be the culpable party. However, the Court noted
that the state objective was of overriding importance. The legislature merely sought to achieve its objective through the most
successful means.
Justice Stewart, concurring, stressed that classifications according to gender are permissible. He found the distinction obvious: Women, not men, become pregnant. Therefore, legislation
attempting to avoid the horrible results of teenage pregnancy by
classifying victims and offenders according to sex, is proper and
constitutionally valid.
Justice Blackmun, concurring, noted this case presents an
acceptable means of prohibiting a minor's sexual activity because the crime occurs before a pregnancy has occurred. While
Justice Blackmun would reject a .statute restricting a woman's
procreative choice, the California penal code does not intrude on
such a right. The statute is viewed as a rational means of achieving the state objective of reducing the number of teenage
pregnancies.
Justices Brennan, White and Marshall's dissenting opinion
agreed that the test used in judging California's statute was
Women's Law Forum
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whether the classification is substantially related to an important state objective. However,-according to the dissent, the state
failed to show the link between the state objective and the .legislative goal.
Under Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., 446
U.S. 142 (1980), a state cannot meet the constitutional standard
unless it proves that a gender-neutral statute would not operate
as effectively as a gender-based one. The question, according to
the dissent (and vital in proving a substantial relationship between a gender-based statute and its goal), is whether the statute deters females by punishing only males. California did not
present evidence indicating that fewer statutory rapes occurred
under this statute than would be true with a statute drafted to
punish both male and female offenders.
In concluding, the dissent noted that while the Court's majority advanced the prevention of pregnancy as the state's objective, California legislative history told a different story. California's statutory rape laws were premised on the legislator's view
that an underage female is legally incapable of consenting to
sexual intercourse.
Justice Stevens' separate dissent pointed out the inconsistency in the statute, presuming to specially protect females
while allowing them to freely consent to the very activity from
which they are protected.

B.

LEGISLATION

1. Statutory Rape

S.B. 322-Rains
Chapter 29
Statutes of 1981
Statutory Rape Removed From Child Abuse Definition. This
legislation removes Penal Code section 261 from the sexual assualt definition of child abuse. Section 261 proscribes sexual intercourse with a female, other than the perpetrator's wife, if she is
under eighteen.
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2. Sexual Assault

S.B. 23-Watson
Chapter 726
Statutes of 1981
Evidence of Rape Victim's Sexual Activity. Under Evidence
Code section 782, evidence of a victim's sexual conduct with the
defendant is admissible in a rape action for the purpose of attacking the victim's credibility. This legislation extends admittance of such evidence to other sexual crimes under the Penal
Code. Evidence Code section 1103, which also allows introduction of a victim's sexual activity under special circumstances,
was similarly amended.
A.B. 208-Waters
Chapter 527
Statutes of 198i
Sexual Assualt Advisory Committee. Penal Code section 1386
sets up an advisory committee to aid district attorneys in the
prosecution of sexual assault cases. This section amends the
makeup of the advisory committee to include one member representing either a city police department, or sheriff's department.
II. FAMILY LAW

A.

COMMUNITY PROPERTY

1. Effect of Dissolution Judgment on Quiet Title Action
Badillo u. Badillo, 123 Cal. App. 3d 1009, 177 Cal. Rptr. 56
(4th Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that a quiet title action was properly barred by a default dissolution judgment
which divided community property. The court also held a dissolution judgment reversible where distribution of community
property was unequal and there was a timely appeal.

The couple purchased a home, taking title as joint tenants.
This property was listed as a community asset in the wife's dissolution petition. She obtained a default judgment awarding
one-half the equity to each party. The husband's share was deferred until the house was sold, and the wife was awarded use
and occupancy in the interim.
Ten years later the wife died intestate, leaving five children
Women's Law Forum
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as her heirs at law, and the residence as the bulk of her estate.
The husband sued to quiet title, claiming the residence by right
of survivorship under joint tenancy. The trial court denied the
husband's motion, relying on the final dissolution judgment to
estop the husband's action.
The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting the husband's argument that the final dissolution judgment violated Civil Code section 580 by awarding the wife more than was requested in her
pleadings. Civil Code section 4800 allows the court to value the
community assets and to make a division and distribution in an
equitable manner, absent a written agreement or settlement between the parties. Although the distribution was unequal because the husband's share was deferred until the property was
sold, his failure to file a timely appeal rendered the judgment
final.
2.

Tracing Separate Property Funds

In re Marriage of Cadematori, 119 Cal. App. 3d 970, 174
Cal. Rptr. 292 (1st Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that
tracing the source of funds used in acquiring property by itself
will rebut a community property presumption where title is
taken jointly as husband and wife, and that the Lucas presumption is not limited to single family dwellings.

The wife appealed a dissolution judgment's determination
that a warehouse was the husband's separate property. The
commercial warehouse was purchased with funds the husband
raised from sale of his separate property during the marriage
and with the proceeds of a bank loan. The loan was repaid with
rental income from the property; any surplus was deposited in a
joint bank account. The deed listed title in names of both the
husband and the wife.
Under Civil Code section 5110, property acquired during
marriage is presumed to be a community holding; The trial
court overcame the presumption by tracing the funds used to
purchase the warehouse to the sale of the husband's separate
property. The trial court also found the husband intended no
gift when title was taken as husband and wife.
The court of appeal reversed and remanded, citing the Cali-
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fornia Supreme Court's decision of In re Marriage of Lucas, 27
Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980) in which the
community property presumption was distinguished from the
situation where there was an express designation of title specifying the form of ownership.
Lucas determined that an express designation of ownership,
e.g., taking of title as joint tenants, as in the present case, is
inconsistent with an intention to retain a separate property interest. A greater showing of intent, i.e., an express agreement or
understanding, is necessary to overcome the strong community
presumption. Here, there was no such agreement.

The court of appeal noted that Lucas should be applied to
any form of conveyance taken in both names, was not limited to
joint tenancy, and that the Lucas presumption was not limited
to single family dwellings.
3. Employment Benefits Received After Separation
In re Marriage 0/ Flockhart, 119 Cal. App. 3d 240, 173 Cal.
Rptr. 818 (lst Dist. 1981). A husband's "weekly layoff benefits"
payment was held by the court of appeal to be separate property
where such payment constituted present, rather than deferred
compensation, and where the couple had separated prior to receipt of the payment.

The wife appealed that portion of an interlocutory dissolution judgment declaring a weekly layoff benefit to be the husband's separate property. He had lost his job after the couple's
separation. The benefit was granted pursuant to the Redwood
Employee Protection Program (REEP), which contained provisions to maintain income for employees directly affected by the
expansion of the Redwood National Park. The court of appeal
affirmed.
In In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561,
126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976), the California Supreme Court ruled
that property attributable to community earnings was to be divided equally upon dissolution. The court of appeal distinguished the Brown form of community property (deferred compensation based upon the contractual rights of marriage) from 8
Women's Law Forum
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form of benefit payment resulting from present status. The
Flockhart court relied on In re Marriage of McDonald, 52 Cal.
App. 3d 509, 125 Cal. Rptr. 160 (2d Dist. 1975), which found
that a worker's compensation award received after separation
was a form of benefit based upon present status, therefore separate property. Here, the court determined that the husband's
weekly benefits payments were based upon the husband's status
as an affected employee under the provisions of the REEP.
4.

Gifts Used to Purchase and Improve Residence

In re Marriage of Gonzales, 116 Cal. App. 3d 556, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 179 (1st Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that where
title in a home is taken by husband and wife as joint tenants,
the home is presumed community property unless a different intent is expressed in the instrument granting title, or unless an
agreement or understanding of an intent to retain separate
property status exists.

The husband and wife purchased a home, taking title as
joint tenants. The wife's father contributed $20,000 toward
purchase and improvement of the home.
The trial court found insufficient evidence to show the contribution represented gifts to both parties, and found that the
joint tenancy was merely a product of financial practices at the
time of the purchase. The trial court determined the family
dwelling was to be distributed according to community and separate property interests involved.
The parties were treated as tenants in common, the husband receiving 20.7%, and the wife 79.3 % of the home's value.
The wife was awarded use of the property; sale of the home was
ordered upon the eighteenth birthday of the couple's youngest
child. In addition, the court reserved jurisdiction to modify the
award.
The husband appealed distribution of the family dwelling.
The court of appeal reversed the lower court's ruling on the
party's respective interests and barred the wife's reimbursement
for separate property funds contributed for improvements. The
ruling was based on the wife's failure to show any intent to retain a separate property interest as required to rebut the pre-
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sumption of Civil Code section 5110, that property held in joint
tenancy is community property for dissolution purposes, under
In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 853 (1980).
5.

Community Presumption of Home Acquired During
Marriage

In re Marriage of Hayden, 124 Cal. App. 3d 72, 177 Cal.
Rptr. 183 (4th Dist., 1981). The court of appeal held that absent
an agreement to the contrary, a home purchased as community
property, with title taken as husband and wife, must be divided
equally upon diss<¥ution without regard to the source of funds
used for the down payment. A residence acquired during marriage is presumed community property absent an agreement or
understanding to the contrary, and tracing the source of funds
used to purchase the property is unnecessary and improper, according to the court. In addition, the same rebuttable presumption of community property arises where a separate savings account is changed to a joint account.

The husband and wife each acquired separate property as a
result of their illinois marital dissolution. They remarried four
months after final judgment. The husband's title in his separate
property was changed to reflect a joint tenancy. The wife sold
her property and deposited the money in a separate savings account. When marital problems arose again, she moved to California and transferred her money to a separate account here.
The husband soon followed, after selling his home in illinois.
Upon his arrival in California, he deposited approximately
$100,000 into the wife's separate account, which was later
changed to a joint account. The couple bought a home using the
husband's $100,000 from the joint account and $5,000 of the
wife's funds. Title was taken in both names, as husband and
wife and cOJ]lmunity property. Dissolution proceedings began
three months later.
The trial court found the joint bank account was the wife's
separate property,. and the home was community property.
There was no evidence of an agreement that either spouse would
get less than a one-half interest in the home. However, the court
Women's Law Forum
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ordered reimbursement of the share each contributed towards
the down payment. The husband received $100,000 and the wife,
$5,000, based on a finding that the parties had not intended reciprocal gifts. The court of appeal reversed. The nature of the
bank account was remanded for further consideration.
Citing In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d
285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980), the court of appeal noted that
division of community property is to be equal, barring evidence
of an agreement or understanding to the contrary. Since the trial
court found no agreement, the court's reimbursement scheme
was incorrect.
The same principle was applied to the bank account funds.
A transfer from separate to joint ownership invoked the rebuttable presumption of a community holding. Since there was no
showing in the record of any agreement that the funds were to
remain the wife's separate property, the matter was remanded
for further investigation.

6. Award of Community Corporation
In re Marriage of Lotz, 120 Cal. App. 3d 379, 174 Cal. Rptr.
618 (2d Dist. 1981). Where parties to a marital dissolution own a
closely held corporation, determination of the corporation's market value cannot be based on a formula used in valuing a publicly held corporation, according to a decision of the court of appeal for the Second District. The court also held that evidence
of a covenant not to compete, regarding a future corporate sale,
could be used in valuing corporate goodwill and did not restrict
the husband's post-marital conduct.
During their marriage, the parties amassed community
property worth $1,200,000. Upon separation, community property consisted primarily of a closely held corporation and the
couple's residence. The community's corporate stock was valued
at $469,000, and their home was valued at $408,000.
The trial court awarded the residence to the wife and the
corporate stock to the husband. A loan from the corporation to
the husband was included in the community's valuation.
The trial court increased 1977 pre-tax earnings of $47,969
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by $24.000. then multiplied that figure by seven to arrive at a
valuation of corporate stock. The total figure of $469.000 constituted the community stock's market value. The multiplier used
in the evaluation is commonly used in valuing publicly held corporations. Included in the total worth was corporate goodwill. a
figure which included a covenant not to compete. and other corporate assets.
The husband appealed the interlocutory judgment. contending the court incorrectly valued the close corporation. based on
In re Marriage of Foster. 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49
(lst Dist. 1974), and that the covenant not to compete was improperly considered. He also argued the court abused its discretion, in requiring that he purchase his wife's corporate stock
against his wishes. The husband maintained the business could
continue under'joint control. since the nature of the corporation
was commercial rather than professional.
The court of appeal reversed and remanded, upholding the
trial court's valuation of corporate goodwill, but disapproving its
formula for calculating market value. The vast differences between the nature of public and private corporations precluded
effective use of the common multiplier.
Civil Code section 48OO(b)(1) authorizes an award of any asset to one party to effect an equal division of community property. The court of appeal noted this section gave the trial court
considerable discretion under In re Marriage of Connolly. 23
Cal. 3d 590, 591 P.2d 911, 153 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1977); and In re
Marriage of Emmett, 109 Cal. App. 3d 753, 169 Cal. Rptr. 473
(2d Dist. 1980).
The court of appeal remanded the question of stock division, ordering the lower court to inquire into the possibility of
the couple's joint corporate control. Economic as well as emotional factors were to be analyzed.

B.

CHILD CUSTODY AND CONTROL

1.

Modification of Out-of-State Custody Award

In re Marriage of Leonard. 122 Cal. App. 3d 443, 175 Cal.
Rptr. 903 (lst Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held personal juWomen's Law Forum
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risdiction over both parents is not required for a binding cus·
tody determination under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdic·
tion Act (UCCJA) (Civil Code sections 5150·5174). T~e court
also held that as long as the non·resident parent has been noti·
fied and given an opportunity to be heard, California courts
have jurisdiction to modify a foreign child custody decree under
section 5163.1. Thus, California courts need not defer jurisdic·
tion to the state where the custody decree originated.
The parties divorced in Georgia. By agreement, the wife ob·
tained custody of their daughter, subject to reasonable visitation
by the husband. He moved to California. The child visited him
in California and stayed through the school year.
The father sought modification of the Georgia custody order
in California. Prior to being personally served in Georgia, the
wife kidnapped her daughter, returning to Georgia. The hus·
band retaliated in kind and returned to California.
The wife appeared specially to quash service or to have the
action dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court found
that the wife was adequately notified and that tlie California
court should assume jurisdiction pursuant to Civil Code section
5152.1(b) which allows California courts jurisdiction if in the
child's best interests, if the child has a significant connection
with the state, and if evidence important in determining present
or future care is in the state.
The wife's motion for reconsideration was denied as were
actions before the appellate and Supreme Court of California.
The trial court modified the Georgia custody award by granting
custody to the husband, with conditional visitation privileges to
the wife. The court of appeal affirmed.
Both parties agreed that the jurisdictional requirements of
Civil Code section 5152 were satisfied because the child had
been in California for six months prior to commencement of the
trial. However, the wife argued that personal jurisdiction was
necessary to affect a binding custody modification, citing May v.
Anderson, 345 U.S. 928 (1953). In May the husband filed for
divorce in Wisconsin and had the wife personally served in Ohio.
She failed to appear at trial. The Wisconsin court granted the
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divorce and awarded custody to husband. The wife took the
children to Ohio for a visit and refused to return them. The husband sought a writ of habeas corpus in Ohio for the children's
return.
The Ohio court stated that the Wisconsin decree should be
given full faith and credit and granted the husband's writ. The
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that since the
Wisconsin decree had been decided without personal jurisdiction
over the wife, full faith recognition was not required.
The court of appeal distinguished May by noting that while
full faith and credit of the California decision is not required
where the wife is not under personal jurisdiction of the court,
May does not prohibit recognition as a means of comity. The
UCCJA provides a network through which states mutually agree
to assure that the resolution of a child custody dispute takes
place in the state with the closest connection to the child.
2. Constitutionality of Parental Rights Termination
Statute
In re Paula P., 123 Cal. App. 3d 734, 176 Cal. Rptr. 708 (2d
Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that Civil Code section
232, under which minors may be declared free of parental control upon a showing of cruelty or neglect, is not unconstitutional
for vagueness. The terms "cruel" and "neglectful" have simple
definitions clarified by the legislature, said the court.

Paula P., born a heroin addict because of her mother's addiction, was removed from her mother's custody one week after
birth. The minor was declared a dependent child under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 6oo(a) and 600(d) (currently sections 3OO(a) and 3OO(d». She was initially placed with her paternal grandmother, later in foster care. At no time did her mother
visit or provide support. The foster parents, seeking to adopt the
child, filed a petition under Civil Code section 232 to declare her
free of parental control. The foster parents alleged the mother
had abandoned the child at birth, meriting termination of her
parental rights.
The trial court awarded custody to the foster parents based
Women's Law Forum
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on its finding of cruelty and neglect, concluding that the foster
parents were better able to promote the child's best interests.
The natural mother appealed.
The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting the natural mother's
argument that the terms "cruel" and "neglectful" in section 232
were vague and that the section was therefore unconstitutional.
The decision in In re Sherman M., 39 Cal. App. 3d 40, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 847 (2d Dist. 1974) found the terms "habit" or "habitual"
were not vague because they were simple words with easily accessibly definitions. The court of appeal applied the same reasoning to "cruel" and "neglectful", concluding that neither term
was vague.
3.

Child's Right to Compel Parent's Visitation

Louden v. Olpin, 118 Cal. App. 3d 565, 173 Cal. Rptr. 447
(2d Dist. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 601 (1982). The court of
appeal held. that a child cannot compel visits by her noncustodial parent through a court order.

A child, represented by her mother, brought an action alleging her father had a duty to visit her, but had failed to do so.
The child's mother had never married the father; the child lived
with her mother and received support from the father as result
of a paternity action.
The trial court dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, and independently ordered the file on the action sealed. In
affirming the lower court's action, the court of appeal noted that
the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), Civil Code section 7000, does
not give a child the right to compel visitation.
The child sought to have the ruling in Griffith v. Gibson, 73
Cal. App. 3d 465, 142 Cal. Rptr. 176 (4th Dist. 1977), applied
reciprocally to her. The court in Griffith had interpreted the
UP A as extending visitation rights to a father of a child born out
of wedlock, regardless of the current marital status of the parents. The Louden court declined such application, because Griffith extended the right to fathers, not children.
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4. Prohibiting Children From Living In Condominium
Complex
O'Connor v. Village Green Owners' Association,t 123 Cal.
App. 3d 789, 177 Cal. Rptr. 159 (2d Dist. 1981), hearing granted,
Nov. 27, 1981. A condominium covenant limiting residency to
individuals over the age of eighteen was held valid and enforceable by the court of appeal. Such age discrimination is neither
prohibited by the California or United States Constitutions and
is not unreasonable nor arbitrary, according to the court.

A husband and wife bought the condominium in question
and later had a child. When the condominium association notified them of its intent to enforce the covenant, the couple filed
this action seeking invalidation of the restriction. The trial court
dismissed the complaint without leave to amend.
The court of appeal upheld the covenant, finding no state
action involved. Although Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948),
held that judicial enforcement of a private covenant constituted
state action, there was no specific prohibition in either the
United States or California Constitutions against age discrimination, thus there was no constitutional violation.
The court noted that because age was excluded as a protected class in housing statutes, whereas it was included in employment legislation, the legislature must have intended that age
was not a protected class in the housing area. Support for this
inference was found in the court of appeal decision in Ritchey v.
Villa Nueva Condominium Association, 81 Cal. App. 3d 688,
146 Cal. Rptr. 695 (lst Dist. 1978), which involved a similar covenant. The court in Ritchey stated that a condominium association had the implied right and authority to regulate activities
which would disturb the entire group. Here, the court found that
children could provide a disturbance and that regulation of residency on the basis of age to protect the entire group of homeowners was not unreasonable nor arbitrary.
t Since the California Supreme Court granted a hearing in this case. the court of
appeal opinion is of no force or effect and is no longer an authoritative statement of any
principle of law. Pince v. Marr. 47 Cal. 2d 159.301 P.2d 837 (1956); Knouse v. Nimocka.
8 Cal. 2d 482. 66 P.2d 438 (1937). This cue appeara in this Survey solely to familiarize
the reader with issues pending before the high court.
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Admissibility of Medical Records to Determine Extent
of Visitation Rights

Simek v. Simek, 117 Cal. App. 3d 169, 172 Cal. Rptr. 564
(lst Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that disclosure of
records, protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege, may
not be compelled to demonstrate a parent suffers from emotional problems which would preclude visitation rights.

Pursuant to a dissolution, the wife was granted custody of
her two minor children. A visitation schedule for the husband
was never agreed upon. The husband later sought extensive visitation privileges and the wife petitioned for termination of the
husband's visitation rights until his emotional status was
determined.
The wife subpoenaed her former husband's psychiatric
records, alleging he had been treated two years earlier for a
mental breakdown, and one year earlier for a suicide attempt.
The trial court denied the husband's motion to quash. The
records were sealed and delivered to the court for inspection at
the visitation hearing. The court of appeal reversed. Evidence
Code section 1014 extends the physician-patient privilege to
communications between a patient and psychotherapist.
The wife argued that by seeking extensive visitation rights
the husband had tendered his mental condition as an issue,
thereby triggering the exception set forth in Evidence Code sections 996 and 1016. However, the court of appeal found this exception can be invoked only where patients have initiated an action in which they voluntarily disclose the information, and
cited Koshman v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 3d 294, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 588 (3d Dist. 1980). The court noted that the privilege is
stronger in visitation cases because visitation rights are a matter
of natural right to a non-custodial parent. Feist v. Feist, 236 Cal.
App. 2d 433, 46 Cal. Rptr. 93 (4th Dist. 1965). The court found
that a waiver of privilege based upon the husband's assertion of
his natural right to visitation was anomalous.
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SPOUSAL AND CHILD SUPPORT

1. Automatic Reduction of Child Support

Comstock v. Comstock, 116 Cal. App. 3d 481, 172 Cal. Rptr.
148 (5th Dist. 1981). The Court of appeal found a court-ordered
child'support obligation could not be reduced proportionately by
the number of children having reached majority or becoming
emancipated.

The wife sought unpaid child support based on a dissolution
judgment entered in South Dakota and registered in California.
The South Dakota decree established monthly child support until the five children came of age. At the time of the hearing, all
but one child was emancipated.
The trial court found for the wife but determined that support payments would be reduced proportionately for each child
having reached the age of majority.
The court of appeal remanded for modification based on the
wife's financial circumstances. The court relied on Spivey v.
Furtado, 242 Cal. App. 2d 259, 51 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1st Dist. 1966),
which held that child support awards should not be reduced proportionately merely because a child has reached majority.
The court of appeal determined the South Dakota decree
was modifiable, both in terms of installments past due and payments becoming due, under Rudd v. Gerker, 67 S.D. 534, 295
N.W. 491 (1940). The court's authority to modify the South Dakota decree came from Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal. 2d 465,
283 P.2d 19 (1955), where it was held that a foreign dissolution
decree could be the basis of a California judgment for unpaid
support. Under Worthley, a foreign order could be modified in
California courts to the extent it could be modified in the state
of original decree.
2. Constitutionality of Agreement for Entry of Child Support Judgment
County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d
988, 177 Cal. Rptr. 70 (2d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held
that County of Ventura v. Castro, 93 Cal. App. 3d 462, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 66 (2d Dist. 1979), which found Welfare and Institutions
Women's Law Forum
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Code section 11476.1 to be unconstitutional, could not be applied retroactively. Section 11476.1 authorized a district attorney to enter into an agreement with a non-custodial parent for
the entry of a child support judgment.
The district attorney of Los Angeles County entered agreements with several putative fathers whereby they agreed to pay
child support. These agreements were entered as judgments pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 11476.1. In Castro, the court of appeal held this section unconstitutional for not
providing obligees with notice and an opportunity to be heard in
the absence of an informed waiver of their constitutional right.
Castro expressly declined to address the ruling'S retroactivity.
When the putative fathers failed to make payments ordered
by the judgments, the district attorney filed contempt charges.
The fathers petitioned to vacate the child support judgments,
citing Castro. Their motion was granted. The district attorney
appealed.
The court of appeal ordered the trial court to reinstate the
judgments against the fathers. The court held Castro did not apply retroactively, citing Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d
226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1979). In Salas, the California Supreme
Court allowed indigent defendants in a paternity suit the right
to counsel. However, this right applied only to final judgments
as of the date of Salas. The California Supreme Court stated
that the establishment of obligations and familial ties resulting
from final judgment on child support necessitated a denial of
retroactivity of the Salas holding.
The court here also noted the important public interest in
protecting finality of judgments and reliance interests of those
affected by such judgments. Additionally, it noted an administrative nightmare would result were Castro given retroactive
application.
3. Modification of Marital Settlement Agreement
Fukuzaki v. Superior Court, 120' Cal. App. 3d 454, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 536 (3d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that Civil
Code section 4811, covering modification of child or spousal support, allows the court to retain jurisdiction to modify the terms
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of a marital settlement agreement unless the settlement agreement specifically disallows modification.
On separation, husband and wife entered into a settlement
agreement providing for spousal support and waiving all other
rights of the parties. The agreement appeared to be a final disposition of the parties' rights and obligations and was incorporated into the dissolution judgment. There was never any reference to modification of support.
The wife later sought to modify the support provision. The
trial court's jurisdiction was based upon the terms of the settlement agreement. The husband's petition to nullify the modification was granted.
The court of appeal dismissed the husband's petition. Although the couple's agreement was silent as to modification, it
did not waive the requirements of Civil Code section 4811(b)
which allows modification by court order absent a written agreement to the contrary.
4. Determination of Age of Majority for Support
In re Marriage of Golden, 123 Cal. App. 3d 567, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 807 (2d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that a child's
age of majority for support purposes is twenty-one for orders issued prior to March 4, 1972. Civil Code section 25.1 outlines legislative intent concerning use of the term "age of majority." The
section notes that after March 4, 1972, the age of majority decreased from twenty-one to eighteen.

An interlocutory decree of dissolution issued November 26,
1971 provided for support of the couple's three children "until
the age of majority." The final decree was issued July 19, 1972.
The wife petitioned to increase child support. At the time of her
motion, the children were all between the ages of 18 and 21. The
husband argued his support obligation ended when the youngest
child turned eighteen since the final decree had been issued after the change in the age of majority.
The husband theorized that the interlocutory decree merged
with the final decree and was therefore superceded. The trial
court rejected this argument, determining the applicable age of
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majority to be twenty-one. The court of appeal affirmed, holding
that the interlocutory decree is a final adjudication on all issues
decided unless vacated. Therefore, the date of the interlocutory
decree controlled.
5.

Conflict Over Age of Majority For Child Support
Purposes

In re Marriage of Taylor, 122 Cal. App. 3d 209, 175 Cal.
Rptr. 716 (2d Dist. 1981). Out-of-state support orders decreeing
that accrued installments are not modifiable are entitled to full
faith and credit in California courts under the exact terms of the
foreign court's order, according to the court of appeal. The court
also held that an action seeking enforcement of a support order
under provisions of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act (URESA) does not operate as a waiver of constitutional full faith and credit protections.

The Taylor marriage was dissolved in Missouri. The judgment ordered the husband to support the children until the age
of majority. He moved to California, and the wife registered her
Missouri judgment in California under provisions of Code of
Civil Procedure section 1698.3, the URESA. When the wife
moved for a computation of the support arrearage, the husband
argued that California's age of majority (18) should be used for
computation purposes, instead of Missouri's age of majority (21).
The trial court recognized the Missouri judgment and ordered the husband to continue support payments for two children between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. The court of
appeal affirmed.
The California Supreme Court decision in Biewend v.
Biewend, 17 Cal. 2d 108, 109 P .2d 701 (1941), was noted by the
court of appeal as similar to the case at bar. In Biewend, a wife
sought enforcement of a Missouri alimony judgment in California. Under California law, alimony would have terminated upon
the wife's remarriage. The Biewend court held that the Missouri
judgment was enforceable under the United States Constitution's full faith and credit clause, provided the accrued installments were not subject to modification by the court of original
jurisdiction.
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The husband nevertheless sought to limit the wife's URESA
remedy by narrowing the judgment's enforcement to the procedures outlined in Code of Civil Procedure section 1670, which
defines the husband's duties as those under the state in which
the husband was present when support was due. The husband
argued his duties thus came under California law and that they
extended only until his children reached their eighteenth birthday. The court of appeal found this argument unpersuasive, reasoning that section 1670 is an extension, not a restriction of support duties.
6. Modification of
Circumstances

Support

Based

Upon

Current

In re Marriage of Thomas, 120 Cal. App. 3d 33, 173 Cal.
Rptr. 844 (4th Dist. 1981). Where a couple stipulated to child
support, without detailing their financial circumstances, the
court of appeal allowed modification without showing a change
in circumstances.

The wife was awarded custody of three minor children in an
interlocutory dissolution judgment, and her husband was ordered to pay child support. Their financial status was not
presented to the court.
The husband's request for modification of child support was
granted. The wife appealed, arguing her husband failed to prove
a change in circumstances justifying modification.
The court of appeal affirmed the modification. Under Moore
v. Moore, 274 Cal. App. 2d 698, 79 Cal. Rptr. 293 (2d Dist. 1969),
modification does not require a change in circumstances; it can
be based on current financial circumstances. Absent evidence of
financial circumstances at dissolution, evidence of current circumstances assessing child support payments was proper, according to the court.
The court noted that such modifications can be avoided by
showing relevant facts on which the original order was based.
Women's Law Forum

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss3/8

24

Modena-Kurpinsky: California Law Survey

CALIFORNIA LAW SURVEY

1982]

7.

745

Automatic Wage Assignment Upon Default of Support
Payments

LeClaire v. LeClaire, 118 Cal. App. 3d 931, 173 Cal. Rptr.

740 (2d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that when child
support payments are two months in arrears in a twenty-four
month period, the trial court must allow a wage assignment
under Civil Code section 4701(b).
The husband was $900 in arrears in child support which included nonpayment for at least two of the previous twenty-four
months. The wife filed a motion for wage assignment. The husband responded with a declaration stating his inability to pay
and his opposition to the assignment on the grounds that it
might adversely affect his employment. The wife's motion for assignment was denied by the trial court without giving any
reasons.
The court of appeal reversed and remanded based on its interpretation of Civil Code section 4701, which sets out statutory
requirements for wage assignments. Section 4701 provides for
assignments which "may" be ordered in subdivision (a), and in
subdivision (b), authorizes mandatory assignments when certain
conditions are met. Mandatory assignments are provided to insure timely payments to children and to provide for swift access
to the courts with a minimum of procedure, under In re Marriage of DeMore, 93 Cal. App. 3d 785, 155 Cal. Rptr. 899 (lst
Dist. 1979).
Civil Code section 4701(b) mandates wage assignment where
child support was ordered by the court and where the parent so
ordered is in arrears in payment in an amount equal to two
months payment within a twenty-four month period preceding
the submission of a petition for assignment.
8.

Enforcement of Spousal Support Judgment

Liebow v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. App. 3d 573, 175 Cal.

Rptr. 26 (4th Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that an Ohio
money judgment for unpaid spousal support registered in California was enforceable under the Sister State and Foreign
Money Judgment Act (SSFMJ), Code of Civil Procedure section
1710.10, rather than under the Revised Uniform Reciprocal En-
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forcement of Support Act of 1968 (RURESA).
A marital settlement agreement entered into in Ohio by
husband and wife provided for the wife's support. The wife obtained a final money judgment in Ohio for the $6,025 in arrears.
Following the husband's move to California, the wife registered
her money judgment in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure
section 1710.10 (SSFMJ). Registration under this section gave
the Ohio judgment the same effect and enforceability as a California money judgment.
The husband's motion to stay execution was granted. The
court reasoned enforcement of the Ohio judgment was only
proper under RURESA. The wife petitioned for an alternative
writ.
The court of appeal directed the trial court to vacate its order staying enforcement and to grant the wife's motion for reconsideration. The court then ordered denial of the husband's
motion for a protective order preventing levy of the money
judgment.
Initially, the court noted the husband incorrectly challenged
enforcement of the judgment in California. Under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1710.40, a spouse can move to vacate an order
but cannot file an ex parte application for stay of execution as
the husband did. The result, however, was unaffected and enforcement was nullified. For purposes of analysis, the court of
appeal assumed the wife's judgment had been vacated.
Code of Civil Procedure section 1710(c) defines an SSFMJ
judgment as that part of any judgment requiring payment of
money; it does not include support orders as defined in section
1653(k). That section defines support orders as judgments in
favor of an obligee whether temporary, final, subject to modification, revocation or remission. The court of appeal found the
wife's Ohio money judgment was a final, liquidated judgment
not subject to modification which was therefore enforceable
under SSFMJ.
The court read the phrase "or subject to modification" in
section 1653(k) to effectively and legally mean "and subject to
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modification." In addition, the court found that United States
Constitution Article IV, section 1, required the California legislature to give full faith and credit to the wife's judgment since
she had reduced the unpaid support obligation to a money
judgment.
9. Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident Parent in Support
Action
McGlothen v. Superior Court, 121 Cal. App. 3d 106, 175
Cal. Rptr. 129 (1st Dist. 1981), modified, rehearing denied, 121
Cal. App. 3d 970b (1981). The court of appeal affirmed jurisdiction over a non-resident and ordered spousal support where the
non-resident's abandonment of his wife and child burdened the
California welfare system. The court found the defendant had
sufficient connections with California to allow jurisdiction.

The husband was employed by the Chicago Cubs baseball
team. He closed the couple's joint checking and savings account
and refused to support his wife and two sons. After moving to
California, the wife was forced to obtain welfare. She petitioned
the court for child and spousal support from her husband.
As a non-resident, the husband appeared specially to object
to the court's jurisdiction. His motion to quash for lack of jurisdiction was denied. The husband petitioned for an alternative
writ of mandate. The court of appeal denied the peremptory
writ and discharged the alternative writ.
Code of Civil Procedure section 410.10 authorizes California
courts to exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with
the constitutions of California or the United States. The standard measure of proper jurisdiction is reasonableness, considering the relationship of a non-resident with the state under
Kulko v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 586 (1977), reversed on other grounds, 463 U.S. 84 (1978);
Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 352 (1976).
The court of appeal found the facts similar to those of In re
Marriage of Lontos, 89 Cal. App. 3d 61, 152 Cal. Rptr. 271 (4th
Dist. 1979). There, the husband abandoned his wife and child in
New Mexico forcing them to move in with relatives in California
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and obtain welfare. The Lantos court found that the husband
compelled the wife's move, and that he benefitted by having the
state take on his financial duties. By exercising in personam jurisdiction over the husband, the court was able to enter a judgement for child and spousal support.
The McGlothen court found that the husband in this case
had also caused the state to take on his financial responsibilities.
Applying Lantos, the court concluded that its exercise of personal jurisdiction over the husband was appropriate and did not
offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice
required by World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. u. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980).
10. Parent's Custodial Care of Children's Assets
Newman u. Newman, 123 Cal. App. 3d 618, 176 Cal. Rptr.
723 (2d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that the parents'
duty to support minor children is different from their role as
custodians. The court held that under Civil Code section
1158(b), a father could not use stock dividend payments belonging to his minor children, and over which he was custodian, to
pay support obligations.

A dissolution decree ordered the father to pay monthly
child support and the two minor children's medical and dental
bills. The interlocutory decree also made him holder and custodian of stock certificates issued in his name for the health, education and welfare of the children.
The wife sought payment from the father for medical bills
and child support plus an accounting of dividends received on
the stocks, and transfer of certificates to her control. The father
had kept no records of the dividends, which he used to help pay
support.
The trial court found the father's use of the stock dividends
was within the meaning of the interlocutory decree and therefore proper.
The court of appeal reversed, disagreeing with the trial
court's interpretation of the interlocutory decree. The matter
was remanded for redetermination under Civil Code section
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1158(b). Section 1158(b) states that a custodian shall expend for
a minor's benefit, so much of the custodial property as necessary, with or without regard to the duty of himself or any other
person to support the minor. The court of appeal found the trial
court's interpretation of the interlocutory decree directly violated the custodial duty imposed in section 1158(b).
D.

DISSOLUTION PROCEEDINGS

1.

Untimely Request for Attorney's Fees

In re Marriage of Kasper,t 117 Cal. App. 3d 118, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 449 (5th Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that a motion for attorney fees and costs on appeal in connection with a
dissolution proceeding was untimely because it was made after
judgment on appeal was final.

The wife filed a memorandum of costs on appeal two days
after remittitur of the court of appeal decision regarding her dissolution was filed with the county. The wife's declaration supporting her motion was made twelve days after filing the memo.
She was awarded attorney's fees.
The court of appeal reversed, based on the legislative intent
of Civil Code section 4370(a) which provides that a court may
order payment of court costs and attorney fees in a dissolution
proceeding. The court found no reference in this section to fees
after a proceeding is no longer pending. Bruce v. Bruce, 160 Cal.
28, 116 P. 66 (1911), defined pendency as the time from commencement of a dissolution action until final determination
upon appeal, or until time for appeal has passed. Here, the court
found the wife's motion for attorney's fees was untimely because
it was made after judgment on the husband's appeal was final.
2. Exclusion From Family Residence
In re Marriage of Parker, 118 Cal. App. 3d 291, 173 Cal.
Rptr. 356 (2d Dist. 1981), modified, 119 Cal. App. 3d 448a
(1981). The court of appeal held that sole and exclusive use of a
t The California Supreme Court denied hearing this case and ordered the opinion
not published May 27, 1981. Under CAL. CT. R. 977 this opinion may not be cited to any
court. The case appears in the Survey solely to familiarize the reader with the issues
presented.
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family residence could not be granted prior to dissolution unless
the excluded spouse had assaulted or threatened to assault the
other spouse and physical or emotional harm to someone in the
household would otherwise result.
The husband appealed an order during a dissolution proceeding excluding him from his family residence. The trial court
had awarded the wife temporary physical custody of the children allowing her sole and exclusive use of the couple's home as
custodial parent. The court issued the order pursuant to Civil
Code section 5102 which allows temporary exclusion of either
party to a dissolution proceeding from the family residence.
The court of appeal reversed. At the time of the order,
dwelling exclusions were authorized merely upon showing physical or emotionat harm would otherwise result. However, Civil
Code section 5102 was amended to allow the court to grant exclusive use of the family residence to a party in a dissolution
proceeding only after a showing of physical assault or threat of
assault. Where there is a substantial change made in a code section, such as here, current law controls under the holding of
White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94
(1975).
3. Award of Business Name on Dissolution
In re Marriage of Shelton, 118 Cal. App. 3d 811, 173 Cal.
Rptr. 629 (3d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held, inter alia,
that the issue of whether award of a business name in a dissolution action constitutes unfair competition is a question of fact.
Since nothing in the record on review supported a conclusion of
unfair competition, the husband's motion for modification of a
dissolution award was properly denied.

During their marriage, the couple established the Shelton
Realty Company. Upon dissolution, the trial court awarded the
business to the husband, subject to the right of the wife to use
the name Fran Shelton Realty in any new real estate business.
The husband filed a motion requesting modification of this
award. He sought to deny his wife use of the name awarded or
any other name similar to Shelton Realty. The trial court denied
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his motion.
The court of appeal noted that the likelihood of confusion
between trade names is a question of fact under the holding of
Visser v. Macres, 214 Cal. App. 2d 249, 29 Cal. Rptr. 367 (4th
Dist. 1963).
The court also reasoned that the relief sought by the husband could be obtained under a proceeding brought under Business and Professions Code section 14330. That section provides
injunctive relief for likely injury to business reputation, notwithstanding the absence of competition between parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods and services.
The court of appeal also held that a car bought by the husband with money accumulated through gambling, was community property. Where the husband's contribution towards the
winnings was minimal and the community's contribution substantial, the entire winnings would be considered community
property.
One year after the couples' separation, but prior to the interlocutory dissolution judgment, the husband withdrew $500
from the community's bank account and sold community personal property for $9,500. Using the community's $10,000 as a
stake, he won $22,000 at the Nevada gaming tables, then bought
a $32,000 Ferrari automobile with his winnings and the community's $10,000.
The trial court held that the $32,000 used to buy the Ferrari
was community property and that the wife was entitled to
$16,000 of the asset. The court of appeal affirmed, citing
Kershman v. Kershman, 192 Cal. App. 2d 18, 13 Cal. Rptr. 288
(2d Dist. 1961). In Kershman, the court held that proceeds were
separate where the community property portion in the commingled funds was minimal compared to the separate property portion. The court of appeal applied this rule, slightly reversed: The
husband's contribution to the gambling winnings were minimal
- consisting solely of luck, while the community provided
$10,000 - a substantial amount.
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4. Death of Spouse During Dissolution Proceedings
Kinsler v. Superior Court, 121 Cal. App. 3d 808, 175 Cal.
Rptr. 564 (2d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that the
death of spouse after a final dissolution judgment does not deprive a trial court of jurisdiction over remaining issues in a dissolution proceeding.

During the dissolution proceeding, the trial court entered
several minute orders concerning the use and disposition of
property and awarded temporary spousal support to the wife. A
final judgment was entered, with the trial court reserving jurisdiction to determine separate property and distribute community property. The husband died six days after final judgment.
The trial court order ended the action and vacated all orders regarding spousal support, possession of real estate and restraining orders made as of the husband's death. The trial court
reasoned that the husband's death deprived it of jurisdiction to
determine issues remaining undecided at final judgment based
on its interpretation of In re Marriage of Shayman, 35 Cal. App.
3d 648, 111 Cal. Rptr. 11 (lst Dist. 1973). In Shayman, the husband died prior to final judgment but after the court made its
findings and conclusions and entered an interlocutory judgment.
In reviewing Shayman, the court of appeal noted that death
of a party to a dissolution proceeding normally ends the action
and deprives the court of jurisdiction to decide further issues.
However, because the Shayman court had made certain findings
prior to the husband's death, jurisdiction continued to implement orders necessary to carrying out those findings.
The court of appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate
ordering the superior court to vacate its order, substitute in the
husband's estate and determine issues over which jurisdiction
had been reserved.
5. Discovery of Spouse's Employment Records
Rifkind v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 1045, 177 Cal.
Rptr. 82 (2d Dist. 1981). Records of corporate employees' earnings were held nondiscoverable in a marital dissolution proceeding. The court of appeal held that a balancing test, weighing the
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party's need for the information against the non-party's constitutional right to privacy, must be used before discovery is ordered. Discovery should not be compelled where records sought
are not relevant to the issues in a marital dissolution, according
to the court.
In addition, the court held that in order to facilitate truthful income tax returns, income tax records are also
nondiscoverable.
In Rifkind, the wife sought certain documents from her husband during their dissolution action. He had been president of a
corporate law firm. Financial reports of the law firm through
1979 had been produced prior to this action; 1980 reports were
promised. The husband was willing to produce records of his
earnings, pensions and obligations, but objected to production of
income tax returns from the law corporation and three partnerships, as well as records relating to the financial earnings of
other shareholders. The superior court ordered production of the
documents. The husband appealed.
The court of appeal ordered the superior court to vacate its
order. It held that the under the rule of Webb v. Standard Oil,
49 Cal. 2d 509, 319 P.2d 621 (1957), production of income tax
returns may not be compelled through coercion for the benefit of
a private litigant, and that the rule applies despite the husband's control over corporate tax returns as president of the
corporation.
The wife's request for documents concerning compensation
and profit sharing plans of other corporate employees was denied as irrelevant.
6.

Change of Venue Improperly Denied

Silva v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 301, 173 Cal.
Rptr. 832 (2d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that a superior court abused its discretion in denying change of venue in a
dissolution proceeding where denial was not supported by substantial evidence. Code of Civil Procedure section 397 allows
change of venue when several factors are met, among them,
when the convenience of witnesses and justice will be served;
and-specifically in dissolution proceedings-when the ends of
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justice will be promoted.
The wife petitioned for dissolution in Los Angeles, her residence. The husband moved for a change of venue to San Mateo
County stating that he had custody of the couple's six children,
that he worked in San Mateo, and that the home the couple
owned was in San Mateo. He alleged a trial in Los Angeles
would be an extreme hardship on his children and himself.
The husband's motion was denied despite the fact it was
unopposed by the wife. On review, the court of appeal ordered a
change of venue to San Mateo County.
The wife appealed, alleging that under Code of Civil Procedure section 397(3) and Flanagan v. Flanagan, 175 Cal. App. 2d
641, 346 P.2d 418 (2d Dist. 1959), a motion for change of venue
must contain the names of witnesses inconvenienced, a statement on the relevance of their testimony and an explanation of
the alleged inconvenience.
The court stated that Flanagan did not require affidavits
and that other requirements of section 397 had been met. It was
evident from his declaration that child custody was an issue.
Since the children were likely witnesses, the inconvenience of
traveling to Los Angeles County and missing school established
the witnesses' inconvenience. There was no question that the
children's testimony was relevant to the custody issue according
to the court.
Balancing considerations of the wife's economic situation
against the husband's costs of moving his family to Los Angeles
for trial, the court concluded that changing venue to San Mateo
County supported the ends of justice.

7. Discoverability of Spouse's Business Records
Smith v. Superior Court, 118 Cal. App. 3d 136, 173 Cal.
Rptr. 145 (1st Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that names
of a husband's psychiatric patients were privileged from discovery in a dissolution proceeding. The wife sought disclosure of the
names to determine the community's financial status.
The husband, a psychiatrist, sought a writ of mandate to
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restrain his wife from enforcing a discovery order requiring him
to produce the names, addresses and telephone numbers of current and former patients. The wife's request stemmed from a
challenge of the husband's financial records produced during a
dissolution proceeding. The husband's records consisted solely
of income tax returns and bank deposit slips. The wife was in
possession of the husband's appointment book and contended
that the book evidenced a higher yearly income.
The trial court denied the husband's motion finding no psychotherapist-patient privilege in the information the husband
was compelled to disclose and noting the insubstantial nature of
the records already produced.
The court of appeal issued a peremptory writ of prohibition,
restraining enforcement of the discovery order. The court noted
that Evidence Code section 1014 gave the husband the privilege
to refuse disclosure of confidential communications. The California Supreme Court in In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d
557,85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970) implied that identity of an individual undergoing psychotherapy was included in the section 1014
privilege. The court of appeal found persuasive the reasoning of
City of Alhambra v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 3d 513, 168
Cal. Rptr. 49 (1980), in which a policeman was not compelled to
disclose psychiatric treatment. The court there ruled that a
broad privilege should be given to psychiatrists and their patients, due to the sensitive nature of the privacy interests
involved.
E.

HEALTH AND WELFARE

1.

Ability of Department
Sterilizations

of Health

to

Regulate

California Medical Ass'n v. Lackner, 124 Cal. App. 3d 28,
177 Cal. Rptr. 188 (3d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that
the Department of Health Services has power, under the combined authority of Health and Safety Code sections 1275, 1276
and 1294, to regulate operations such as sterilizations. Health
and Safety Code section 1275 gives the Department the power to
adopt, amend or repeal reasonable rules to implement hospital
care regulation. Section 1276 regulates standards of adequacy,
safety and sanitation. The Department may suspend or revoke a
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license where a violation is found, under section 1294.
The court further held that the power to regulate sterilization procedures, stemming from these sections, is consistent
with the legislative intent of section 1258. Section 1258 prohibits
sterilizations based upon nonmedical qualifications, except with
informed consent.
The California Medical Association (CMA) argued that the
Department of Health Services was authorized only to supervise
hospital activities within areas covered in section 1276, such as
buildings, safety and sanitation, and that the power to regulate
the doctor-patient relationship was not expressly given by
statute.
The trial court upheld the regulations affecting informed
consent. The court of appeal affirmed.
The court discussed the general powers sections 1276 and
1294 which enable the Department of Health Services to adopt
rules and suspend violators, and concluded that the section 1258
regulations requiring informed consent, as detailed in Title 22,
would be given weight by virtue of the Department's authority
under these sections.
CMA argued that the Department overstepped its jurisdiction in regulating physicians' conduct; such regulation should be
left to the Board of Medical Quality Assurance. However, the
court found no conBict between the two departments, since any
violation of Title 22 is to be reported only to the Medical Board
and the Department of Health Services will not take independent disciplinary action.
Further, the court rejected CMA's suggestion that informed
consent rules were unnecessary because of the availability of tort
actions. The court stressed there is nothing wrong with the Department seeking to prevent a wrong from occuring in the first
place.
2. Unconstitutionality of Restriction on Medi-Cal Abortion Funding
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal.
Women's Law Forum
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3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981). The California
Supreme Court held unconstitutional provisions of the Budget
Acts. The court found that a restriction on a medical service was
inconsistent with Medi-Cal's stated purpose of providing medical service to the needy, that funding restrictions impaired a woman's right to procreative choice by effectively limiting access to
abortions, and that funding cutbacks were not the least restrictive means of furthering any state interest in childbirth. For an
extensive review of this case, see Note, Committee to Defend
Reproductive Rights v. Myers: Procreative Choice Guaranteed
for All Women, supra, page 691.
3. DES Mother's Disclosure of Personal Medical History
in Daughter's Suit
Jones v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 534, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 148 (lst Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that a diethylstilbestrol (DES) mother could not refuse to disclose her medical history in a suit by her daughter against DES manufacturers.
The mother's partial disclosure of a significant portion of her
personal medical history operated to waive the physician-patient
privilege of Evidence Code section 994.

In a companion case, the court held that a DES daughter
was compelled to seek information from her mother to completely answer interrogatories. The mother-daughter spirit of cooperation existing in the suit justified the order.
Two women brought suit against pharmaceutical companies
for breach of warranties, strict product liability, negligence and
enterprise liability under Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal.
3d 558, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980). Their mothers
had taken DES manufactured by the companies prior to the
births of the plaintiffs. The two cases were consolidated.
The pharmaceutical company moved to compel one mother
to disclose her medical history both prior and subsequent to the
birth of her daughter. The mother responded by agreeing to disclose names of the medical staff who had treated her prior to her
daughter's birth, but refusing to disclose any additional information under the physician-patient privilege.
The trial court ordered her to respond to questions pertain-
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ing to the time period prior to the birth, and her medical history
subsequent to the birth. The court of appeal affirmed.
Under Evidence Code section 994, a patient has a privilege
to refuse disclosure of confidential communications with a doctor. However, this privilege is waived when the patient discloses
a significant part of the communications, under Evidence Code
section 912. The mother's revelation of a significant portion of
her medical history in offering names of physicians and hospitals
acted as a waiver.
The court also concluded the mother's constitutional right
to privacy regarding disclosure of medical information was not
absolute but must be balanced against compelling state interests, such as a defendant's right to discover relevant information. The court of appeal concluded that the order compelling
answers did not force the mother to answer all questions concerning her medical history, but only the few requested.
In the companion case, Benny v. Superior Court, 119 Cal.
App. 3d 534, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148 (lst Dist. 1981), the court cited
Chodos v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. App. 2d 318, 30 Cal. Rptr.
303 (2d Dist. 1963), which stated that a party without knowledge
can be compelled to investigate facts when sources of information are apparently available. Since it appeared from the record
the mother was supporting her daughter'S suit, the trial court's
order compelling the daughter to ask her mother for information
necessary to answer interrogatories was not an abuse of
discretion.

F.

PENSIONS AND DISABILITY BENEFITS

1. Lawyer's Failure to Include Pension As CQmmunity
Asset
Davis v. Damrell, 119 Cal. App. 3d 883, 174 Cal. Rptr. 257
(1st Dist. 1981). The court of appeal refused to hold a lawyer
liable for failure to include a military pension as a community
asset in a dissolution proceeding because the law concerning military pensions changed after the proceeding. The court held failure of the lawyer to anticipate reversal of the law was not
malpractice.
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In 1970, the lawyer represented the wife in a dissolution
proceeding. Although the husband had a vested interest in a
military pension, the lawyer advised the wife that the pension
was not community property. The pension was not included in
the settlement.
.
In 1974, the California Supreme Court determined in In re
Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr.
369, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974), that a vested retirement
benefit, such as the husband's military pension, was subject to
community division upon dissolution. Subsequently, the wife
brought an action charging her lawyer with malpractice for failing to advise her that the community pension area was
unsettled.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the lawyer.
The wife's appeal was denied. The concept of community interest in vested pensions had shifted dramatically in a short period
of time. The court found the lawyer's advice was based upon a
thorough knowledge of case law at the time of the dissolution
proceeding. The court rejected the wife's contention that the
lawyer should have given her the option of claiming the pension
as part of the community's assets and pursuing the matter on
appeal.
The court of appeal concluded that an attorney's duty does
not extend to advising clients on all conceivable alternatives of
action regardless offutility.
2. Distribution of Pension After Dissolution Judgment
Giovannoni v. Giovannoni, 122 Cal. App. 3d 666, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 154 (1st Dist. 1981). Where the distribution of a pension
as a community asset in a dissolution proceeding has not been
adjudicated or approved by the court, the court of appeal held
that a later action for distribution is not barred by res judicata.

The couple stipulated to distribution of community property. This agreement was approved by the court as fair and equitable. A pension the husband was to receive from his employer
was mentioned in the stipulation, but, as understood by both
parties, the pension had no value since there was no vested interest at the time of the dissolution proceeding. The wife's attor-

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982

39

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 8

760

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:725

ney advised her that neither she nor her husband had an interest in the pension.
Three years after the decision, the husband retired and began receiving his pension. It was discovered that the pension had
been fully vested at the time of dissolution. Based on In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633
(1976), the husband's pension was community property and subject to division. The wife filed suit seeking her community interest in the pension.
The wife contended that under Henn v. Henn, 26 Cal. 3d
323, 605 P.2d 10, 161 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1980), res judicata did not
bar her suit for distribution. In Henn, a court had issued an interlocutory and final decree without mention of a vested pension. The Supreme Court of California held that res judicata did
not apply since the issue of the pension had not been before the
court. However, the trial court rejected this argument and dismissed her suit.
The. court of appeal reversed and remanded on a finding
that there had been no adjudication of the parties' rights to the
husband's pension. The husband attempted to distinguish Henn,
arguing that the pension was before the court because it was
mentioned in the stipulation agreement; whereas in Henn, there
was no mention of the asset. The court rejected this distinction,
citing the decision in Miller v. Miller, 117 Cal. App. 3d 366, 172
Cal. Rptr. 745 (4th dist. 1981). In Miller, a similar argument was
rejected where a military pension was mentioned in a stipulation
agreement, but was not litigated as an issue in the distribution
process. In this situation, the pension was withdrawn from the
court's consideration because the parties believed it had no
value and was not litigated in the dissolution proceeding. The
court found Henn controlling, and the wife was therefore free to
pursue her share of the pension, not being barred by res
judicata.
3.

Applicability of McCarty

In re Marriage of Jacanin, 124 Cal. App. 3d 67, 177 Cal.
Rptr. 186 (4th Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that California's community property laws governing distribution of a miliWomen's Law Forum
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tary pension in a dissolution proceeding are preempted by federallegislation under application of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
An interlocutory dissolution judgment gave the wife a share
of her husband's Navy retirement pension in addition to custody
and spousal support provisions.
On appeal, the court disallowed the wife's community interest share in her husband's pension. Despite Congress' failure
to expressly state its intention that federal laws preempt state
community property laws governing military pensions, McCarty
was interpreted by the court as warranting preemption of state
policy concerning division of military pensions upon dissolution.
4. Right to Pension Benefits Resulting From Redeposit
Funds

0/

In re Marriage 0/ Lucero, 118 Cal. App. 3d 836, 173 Cal.
Rptr. 680 (4th Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that a wife's
community interest in her husband's pension extended to the
full amount of benefits after redeposit of employee contributions. The court reasoned that since the wife was willing to pay a
pro-rata share of her husband's separate property redeposit, she
was entitled to share in the resulting increased benefits.

The couple married in 1947 and divorced in 1955. They cohabited until their remarriage in 1956, finally separating in 1976.
The husband worked for the Federal government periodically
during the marriage and accumulated thirty years and one
month of credit towards his employee contribution fund pension. He withdrew $9,373 from this fund in 1966. To receive the
maximum benefit upon retirement he redeposited that amount
after separation, using his separate funds.
The trial court determined that: (1) neither party was entitled to spousal support; (2) the community interest in the husband's benefit equalled the ratio of time of employment during
the second marriage to total time of employment, or 68 percent;
(3) the community's 68 percent interest extended only to benefits the husband would have received absent redeposit of the
amount withdrawn from the fund; (4) the community's interest
in the wife's retirement benefit would be determined using the
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same formula employed to calculate the community's interest in
the husband's fund; and (5) jurisdiction was reserved over distribution of the wife's pension once it fell due.
The court of appeal modified the judgment, allowing the
wife to elect to participate in the husband's increased retirement
benefits upon paying a pro-rata share of the redeposit. In addition, the husband was required to pay the wife her share of payments which were received by him before trial, with future payments disbursed directly to the wife. The judgment also
adjusted the amount of the wife's employment time attributable
to the community's vested interest in her retirement pension.
The trial court's decision to deny the wife's participation in
the husband's increased benefits was viewed by the court of appeal as giving the husband sole control over whether to redeposit
and what funds to use, in effect, treating the pension as the husband's separate property.
In In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561,
126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976), the California Supreme Court determined that the community owns all pension rights attributable
to employment during marriage. Therefore, under Brown, the
trial court was incorrect because the spouses had equal rights
both in determining whether to redeposit, as well as in sharing
in the increased benefits.
The court of appeal also considered In re Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d 779, 582 P.2d 96, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978), in
determining the community's interest in the redeposit of funds.
In Stenquist, the California Supreme Court held that because
the spousal duty of fair dealing did not end with dissolution, a
spouse could not destroy a community interest by invoking a
condition solely within his or her control. Therefore, the husband could not preclude his wife's participation in the increased
benefits through an independent decision to use separate funds
to redeposit.
The wife contended the trial court erred in failing to recognize a community interest in pension rights acquired during the
couple's first marriage. The court of appeal noted. that Brown
was not fully retroactive and did not apply to the first marriage.
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The court of appeal also noted the wife's argument that the
period of cohabitation with her husband entitled her to an additional share in the pension benefits could only be heard in a civil
contracts action under the ruling of Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal.
3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
5. McCarty Not Applicable to Pension Stipulation
In re Marriage of Mahone, 123 Cal. App. 3d 17, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 274 (2d Dist. 1981). Despite the United States Supreme
Court's ruling that community property laws concerning distribution of military pensions are preempted by federal law, the
court of appeal held that a military pension may be treated as a
community interest where parties to a dissolution have so stipulated before the change in law. The parties married while the
husband was in the Air Force. Although he left the military five
years after their marriage, he qualified for a military pension.
(The record does not specify his total years of service.) At the
time of this action, he was receiving $1,811 a month from the
pension.

Under In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d
449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825, reh'g denied,
419 U.S. 1060 (1974) the husband's military pension was a community asset at the time of dissolution. He argued that under
McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981) his military pension
was exempt from distribution. The court rejected this argument
and bound the husband to his stipulation at the time of dissolution, three years before McCarty. The military pension was governed by the law as of the date of the stipulation, therefore, the
military pension was a community holding.
In his dissent, Appellate Court Judge Stephens stressed
that, because a military pension is not community property according to McCarty. the parties were not bound to their previous stipulation.
6.

Retroactivity of McCarty

In re Marriage of Sheldon, 124 Cal. App. 3d 371, 177 Cal.
Rptr. 380 (4th Dist.), modified, 125 Cal. App. 3d 415f (1981).
The Court of Appeal for the Fourth District also limited the retroactivity of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mc-
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Carty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981). McCarty held that federal law preempted community property law governing
distribution of military pensions. The court determined that
McCarty will control: where a case is not final on appeal, only
after the military spouse has raised the issue on appeal, or where
the court was initially requested to reserve jurisdiction over the
military pension.

In its interlocutory decree of dissolution, the court awarded
the residence to the wife, and the husband's military pension to
the husband. The difference in value was waived by the wife.
The husband appealed, arguing he should have received a onehalf interest in the combined value of the assets and did not
contest the designation of the military pension as a community
asset.
The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's award, in an
unpublished opinion filed June 8, 1981. On June 26, 1981, the
McCarty decision was announced. Subsequently, the husband
petitioned for rehearing, arguing that McCarty should be applied retroactively. The court of appeal affirmed the dissolution
award, denying McCarty's application to the husband's case.
Chevron Oil Company v. Hudson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971) established three factors to be used in settling retroactivity issues: (1)
whether the decision to be applied established a new principle,
or was an issue of first impression; (2) whether the purpose of
the decision mandates retroactive application; and (3) whether
retroactive application will result in hardship or injustice.

In analyzing McCarty, the court noted that the issue in McCarty was essentially one of first impression. Chevron presented
a similar situation. There, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that its decision should not be retroactive because it overruled previous decisions. The McCarty decision represented a
dramatic reversal of a long line of California cases holding that
military pensions are community property. Therefore, under the
first Chevron factor, McCarty would not be retroactive.
The stated purpose of Congress in preempting community
property laws governing military pensions were twofold according to McCarty: (1) to provide for retired military personnel and
Women's

La~

Forum

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss3/8

44

Modena-Kurpinsky: California Law Survey

CALIFORNIA LAW SURVEY

1982)

765

(2) that military pensions serve as inducements for enlistment or
reenlistment. In discussing the second factor of the retroactivity
test (whether the purpose of the decision mandates retroactive
application) the court noted that neither congressional purpose
would be furthered by full retroactivity of McCarty. Only a
small number of military spouses, those divorced but not yet retired, would benefit from an extension of McCarty. Similarly,
retroactivity would not induce further enlistments, according to
the court. Therefore, non-retroactive application would result in
minimal harm to both stated federal purposes.
Concerning the third factor, (whether a retroactive application would result in hardship or injustice) the court emphasized
the potential harm that would result if parties were free to relitigate on the basis of McCarty. For example, a spouse might not
be able to repay the military spouse for benefits received or all
plans made in expectation of pension benefits would be destroyed. The court stressed the need for finality in marital dissolution proceedings.
Although the husband argued McCarty should be applied in
his case since his appeal was filed prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision, the court of appeal noted that issues not
raised in opening briefs are waived. The husband failed to include a federal preemption issue during the trial and in the
briefs for petition of rehearing.
7.

Constitutionality of Remarriage Clause in Pension
Legislation

McCourtney v. Cory, 123 Cal. App. 3d 431, 176 Cal. Rptr.
639 (2d Dist. 1981). California Government Code section 75070,
which gives the surviving spouse of a judge, eligible under the
Judges' Retirement Law, an allowance until death or remarriage,
was found constitutional by the court of appeal. Although other
Government Code sections provide allowances for surviving
spouses despite remarriage, the remarriage clause of section
75070 endured equal protection and due process scrutiny. The
court also found section 75070 does not interfere with the right
to marry.

The wives of several deceased judges had challenged the
constitutionality of Government Code section 75070. Under the
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section, they received one-half of their deceased husband's former pay but the allowance was terminable on death or remarriage. The section was challenged on equal protection and due
process grounds because other classes of surviving government
spouses received allowances· despite remarriage. In addition, the
wives argued the section had a chilling effect on their exercise of
the constitutional right to marry.
The trial court issued a declaratory judgment ordering the
Controller of the State of California to pay the wives allowances
until their death. The court of appeal reversed.
The court found that termination of the allowance upon remarriage did not interfere with the wives' right to marry because
there was no direct barrier to marriage. Califano v. Jobst, 434
U.S. 47 (1977), was found directly on point. In Califano, a Social
Security Act provision giving benefits to children of deceased
wage earners made it more desirable for a child to marry a fellow beneficiary. A child's benefits terminated at marriage unless
marriage was to another beneficiary. The Supreme Court found
this statute constitutional. While its effect was to make some individuals preferrable over others, it was not an attempt to interfere with the decision to marry. The effect of section 75070 was
similar with regard to the wives' decision to marry; this statute
did not directly or substantially interfere with their decision.
The wives' second challenge was based on equal protection
grounds. Government Code section 75093, another provision of
the Judges' Retirement Law, applying to spouses of judges who
died in office, gave an allowance without the remarriage limitation. Similarly, section 75033.5 provided a retirement plan for
judges which would give their surviving spouses an allowance for
life. The court of appeal noted, however, that since the fundamental right to marry was not involved, the section only had to
meet rational basis scrutiny under Williamson v. Lee Optical,
348 U.S. 483 (1955). The court found the difference in remarriage limitations between sections 75070 and 75093 could have
been based on the legislature'S perception of differing needs of
surviving spouses. This was found to be a reasonable basis for
distinction between the two classes.
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Suit For Distribution of Military Pension Not Barred

Miller v. Miller, 117 Cal. App. 3d 366, 172 Cal. Rptr. 745
(4th Dist. 1981). Where distribution of a community property
military pension has not been adjudicated, the court of appeal
held that a subsequent suit for partition is not precluded by res
judicata.

The husband retired after seventeen years of military service and began receiving his vested pension. When the couple
separated, they entered into a property agreement which mentioned but did not distribute the pension. This agreement was
incorporated into the interlocutory dissolution judgment. The issue of whether the pension was distributable as community
property was not raised at trial.
The wife filed an action seeking partition of the pension in
accordance with community property laws. The trial court's decision was controlled by Kelley v. Kelley, 73 Cal. App. 3d 672,
141 Cal. Rptr. 33 (4th Dist. 1977), and a nonsuit was granted.
The court barred the wife's suit because the parties knew the
pension was community property at the time of the dissolution
proceeding and could have raised the issue at that trial.
The court of appeal overruled the trial court finding, noting
that the decision of Henn v. Henn, 26 Cal. 3d 323, 605 P.2d 10,
161 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1980) was not available at the time of the
trial. Henn overruled the Kelley application of res judicata. According to Henn, future litigation of community property interests is not precluded unless the issues were subjected to the
court's adjudication, or an agreement between the parties as to
distribution was made.
Although the parties had mentioned the pension in their
stipulation agreement, the court found this was not equivalent
to litigation on the issue of distribution and thus was not subject
to a res judicata bar.
9. Exemption of Pension From Writ of Execution
Roosevelt v. Roosevelt, 117 Cal. App. 3d 397, 172 Cal. Rptr.
641 (2d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that where spousal
support had not been ordered, a pension was exempt from exe-
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cution under Code of Civil Procedure section 690.18. The court
found that exemption statutes are to be construed liberally, and
exceptions to the statutes are to be read narrowly.
Prior to dissolution, the husband and wife had agreed on
spousal support. The parties obtained an interlocutory judgment
in which the agreement was approved, but not merged with the
final judgment. The final judgment contained no express provisions regarding spousal payments.
The wife brought an action for breach of contract and for an
accounting of support due under the agreement. She won a
money judgment from the trial court and obtained a writ of execution which was levied upon her husband's civil service pension. The husband appealed the denial of this claim for an exemption from the writ under Code of Civil Procedure section
690.18.
The court of appeal reversed and remanded. The court of
appeal determined that the principal objective of the exemption
statutes was to provide support and welfare for the debtor's
benefit.
The court found no exception to the exemption statute applicable where, as here, a judgment for payment of spousal support was not subject to modification by the court. The wife's
judgment was based upon a settlement agreement not subject to
modifications; the dissolution judgment itself did not provide for
spousal payments.

G.

INHERITANCE DETERMINATIONS

1.

Claim To Estate Based Upon Premarriage Cohabitation Agreement

Estate of Fincher, 119 Cal. App. 3d 343, 174 Cal. Rptr. 18
(2d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal upheld a probate court's
jurisdiction over a Marvin agreement along with a Probate Code
claim. The court also determined the statute of limitations on a
Marvin agreement accrues once the relationship on which the
contract is based has ended.

Prior to marriage, decedent had lived with plaintiff periodiWomen's Law Forum
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cally for seven years. This relationship was interrupted but later
renewed. They eventually married.
Decedent intentionally omitted his wife from his will, leaving her insurance benefits instead. The wife claimed a portion of
the estate, alleging that decedent's will had been fraudulently
obtained and that her combined status as surviving spouse and
Marvin partner entitled her to one-half decedent's estate.
A jury found the will had not been fraudulently induced
and that seven years of the couple's cohabitation was based on
an implied Marvin agreement. One year of cohabitation, between renewal of their relationship and marriage, was also determined to have been grounded on a Marvin relationship.
At a special hearing, the probate court found that the two
year statute of limitations on the implied Marvin agreement accrued once the parties' first relationship ended, barring enforcement of the implied contract. The court also found the wife had
a community property interest in decedent's estate, commencing
at marriage, and a partnership interest, equivalent to a community interest, from renewal of the couple's relationship until
marriage. The wife's appeal of the trial court's bar of her implied Marvin agreement was denied.
The court of appeal noted that the wife's 'claim under Probate Code section 1080 would be incorrect if her only basis was a
Marvin-type relationship. As surviving spouse, however, the wife
was an heir under section 1080 and could rightfully assert a
claim to community property.
In Estate of Baglione, 65 Cal. 2d 192,417 P.2d 683, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 139 (1966), the California Supreme Court determined that
a probate court having jurisdiction over one aspect of a claim
could hear any ancillary matter such as the wife's Marvin claim.
The wife argued that under Code of Civil Procedure section
339, subdivision (1), her claim accrued at decedent's death. The
court disagreed, noting that the end of the couple's seven year
relationship effectively triggered commencement of any action
the wife had to the community property.
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2. Revocation of Prenuptial Will
Estate of Green, 120 Cal. App. 3d 589, 174 Cal. Rptr. 654
(1st Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that a will made prior
to marriage was revoked as to a surviving spouse, where it either
failed to provide for a future spouse, or failed to specifically disinherit a future spouse or heir.

Decedent made his will prior to marriage, naming his sister
as primary beneficiary. Mter marriage, he failed to change his
will, and died four months later.
The surviving spouse petitioned to determine her entitlement to the estate under Probate Code section 70. Section 70
would revoke decedent's will where the surviving spouse could
show: (1) it was made prior to marriage; (2) the surviving spouse
was not provided for in a marriage contract; (3) decedent's will
did not provide for the surviving spouse; or (4) the surviving
spouse was mentioned in a way showing intent not to provide for
her.
The trial court revoked the will under section 70. Decedent's sister's motions for reconsideration and a new trial were
denied.
In affirming, the court of appeal noted that section 70 represents a policy to resist disinheriting a surviving spouse where a
will made prior to marriage contains no provision for the survivor. The court of appeal noted that decedent's will failed to
clearly manifest an intent to disinherit an after-married surviving spouse, as it must in order to forestall application of section
70.
3. Support Allowance From Estate After Estrangement
Estate of Kalal, 121 Cal. App. 3d 841, 175 Cal. Rptr. 582
(lst Dist. 1981). A surviving spouse's right to an allowance during settlement of the deceased spouse's estate, as provided in
Probate Code section 680, is not absolute, according to the court
of appeal. The section 680 allowance is conditioned upon the
survivor's right to support at the time of the spouse's death.

The court found that a family allowance petition, based on
Women's Law Forum
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a stipulation agreement by parties to a dissolution, was incorrectly denied berause the stipulation did not conform with the
requirements of Civil Code section 5131. Under section 5131, an
agreement to live apart without mutual support is grounds to
deny an allowance.
The court also held that facts indicating spouses are living
apart independently does not constitute waiver of the support
right. However, while a spouse's financial condition cannot be
used to deny a family allowance, it can be a factor in determining necessity.
Upon initiating dissolution proceedings, the wife petitioned
to force her husband to vacate their home. The parties stipulated to certain issues, not pertinent here, and agreed that the
restraining order and order to vacate would operate temporarily.
The agreement did not address spousal support. The wife died
prior to final determination of the dissolution proceeding.
Following the temporary order but prior to the wife's death,
the couple lived apart, did not support each other, and were not
in contact with each other. When the wife died, the husband returned home and petitioned for a family allowance which the
probate court summarily denied. He appealed, contending the
court abused its discretion.
The court of appeal reversed and remanded to consider the
husband's financial circumstances in determining whether an allowance was necessary.
The court cited Estate of Fawcett, 232 Cal. App. 2d 770, 43
Cal. Rptr. 160 (1st Dist. 1965) as establishing that a family allowance is conditioned upon the surviving spouse's right to support at the time of decedent's death. Fawcett was also important
in determining whether the husband was properly denied an allowance under Civil Code section 5131. Civil Code section 5131
states that one spouse need not support the other when the
couple is living apart by agreement, unless support is stipulated
in the agreement. In Fawcett, an order of temporary support expiring prior to the husband's death was not equivalent to an
agreement to live apart, triggering the 5131 exemption.
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In Fawcett, initiation of dissolution proceedings did not operate as an agreement to live apart. Here, the couple signed a
stipulation agreement, had not separated prior to the show cause
hearing and the order to vacate was only temporary.
4. Stepped-up Tax Basis of Surviving Spouse
Mel v. Franchise Tax Board, 119 Cal. App. 3d 898, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 269 (1st Dist. 1981), hearing denied, Sept. 16, 1981. The
court of appeal held that Revenue and Tax Code section
18045(e), in its 1966-1975 version, allowed for an acquired property stepped-up tax basis only where a surviving spouse could
show decedent's gross estate was subject to inheritance taxation.
With the stepped-up tax basis a taxpayer can use the market
value of community assets, as of deceased's death, in computing
personal income tax.

After decedent died, all community property was admitted
to probate, including the surviving spouse's one-half share. The
inheritance tax appraiser, valued the community property at over
five million dollars and assessed inheritance taxes. Following her
husband's death and will administration, the wife sold portions
of her community property share. In calculating personal income
tax, she used the market value of the assets as of her husband's
death as a tax basis.
The Franchise Tax Board disapproved the stepped-up tax
basis and assessed additional income. The wife protested, but
died before the hearing. Her executors brought this action.
The controversy centered on interpretation of Revenue and
Tax Code section 18045(e), which allows a section 18044 tax
base, "if at least one-half of the whole of the community interest
in such property was includable in determining the value of the
Decedent's gross estate under chapter 3 of the California Inheritance Tax Law." The trial court determined the stepped-up tax
basis was proper under section 18045(e) since one-half of the total community interest had been included in decedent's gross
estate.
On appeal, the Franchise Tax Board contended that section
18045(e), in light of federal income statutes, indicated that use
Women's Law Forum

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss3/8

52

Modena-Kurpinsky: California Law Survey

CALIFORNIA LAW SURVEY

1982)

773

of the stepped-up tax basis was improper. The court of appeal
reversed the trial court's ruling.
Both parties agreed section 18045(e) was intended to bring
California into conformity with federal income tax law. Under
federal law, a taxpayer is not entitled to a stepped-up tax basis
unless at least one-half of the community property was subject
to federal estate taxation under Collins v. United States, 318 F.
Supp. 382 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 448 F.2d 787 (9th
Cir. 1971). To insure uniformity, stepped-up basis cannot be
used unless decedent's gross estate was subject to inheritance
tax.
H.

PATERNITY ACTIONS

1.

Cannot Compel Answers to Interrogatories Where Response Would Incriminate

Gonzales v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 57, 178 Cal.
Rptr. 358 (4th Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that putative fathers may be required to answer interrogatories in a paternity action, subject to immunity from use of the answers in a
criminal prosecution.

The Orange County district attorney brought suit on behalf
of recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), to establish paternity and obtain support orders. Suit
was authorized under Welfare and Institutions Code section
11350, which allows the county to sue for recovery of payments
made under the provisions of AFDC, where a parent is found to
be either gainfully employed or reasonably able to assist in support of the recipient.
The interrogatories in question required that the alleged fathers give information regarding their financial status and sexual
relations with the mothers. The trial court ruled that answers
could be used in actions under Penal Code section 270. Section
270 provides that a father of a minor child who willfully fails to
provide remedial care for his child is guilty of a misdemeanor.
The district attorney moved to compel answers under Code of
Civil Procedure section 2034, which provides sanctions for refusal to answer interrogatories.
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A claim of privilege against self-incrimination may be raised
under the fifth amendment by the fathers in any civil or criminal proceedings, including discovery, under Kastigar u. United
States, 406 U.S. 44 (1972); Zonuer u. Superior Court, 270 Cal.
App. 2d 613, 76 Cal. Rptr. 10 (2d Dist. 1969). Further, Evidence
Code section 940 provides a privilege against disclosure of any
matter that may tend to incriminate.
Issuance of a protective order granting the fathers immunity
from use of compelled answers in a criminal proceeding arises
under Code of Civil Procedure section 2019, and was confirmed
in People u. Superior Court, 53 Cal. App. 3d 996, 126 Cal. Rptr.
597 (2d Dist. 1975).
I.

MERETRICIOUS RELATIONSHIPS

1.

Cohabitatant's
Relationship

Agreement

Based

Upon

Sexual

Jones u. Daly, 122 Cal. App. 3d 500, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (2d
Dist. 1981). An action to recover one-half of decedent's estate
based on a cohabitation agreement was dismissed without leave
to amend by the court of appeal. The court held the agreement
could not form the basis of a claim on decedent's estate because
it contained express terms indicating that sexual services were
an inseparable part of the consideration for the agreement and
was therefore illegal.

Two males lived together, holding themselves out as married, for two years prior to decedent's death. According to petitioner's complaint, he quit work to live with decedent, providing
him with services as a lover, companion, homemaker and cook.
Petitioner and decedent had orally agreed that earnings and
property accumulated during their time together would be
shared equally. During their cohabitation, the couple accumulated assets worth two million dollars.
After decedent's death, petitioner filed a creditor's claim in
probate for one-half the estate. The executors denied petitioner's claim under Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d
106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976), arguing that the agreement was
unenforceable because the complaint alleged that petitioner's
sexual services were an express and inseparable part of the
Women's Law Forum
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agreement.
The trial court sustained the executor's demurrer without
leave to amend. The court of appeal affirmed.
Under Marvin, cohabiting adults may contract regarding
distribution of their earnings and property rights, provided that
sex is not the sole or express consideration. Any portion of the
contract that is severable from the sexual consideration is
enforceable.
The court of appeal noted that petitioner's complaint contained on its face language indicating that the contract could not
be considered apart from the sexual acts involved in the relationship and that petitioner's role as lover was of primary
importance.
2. Award For Economic Rehabilitation Rejected
Marvin v. Marvin, 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555
(2d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held an award for economic
rehabilitation was incorrect where not framed as an issue in the
pleadings. Furthermore, although such an award is available
where necessary to protect the parties' expectations, no evidence
was presented to support the award on either legal or equitable
grounds.

Lee and Michelle Marvin cohabited for five years; the relationship ending at his insistence. In the landmark decision, Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815
(1976), the California Supreme Court held that an equitable
remedy could be shaped to protect the parties' legitimate expectations, and remanded. The trial court determined there was
never any agreement to combine income or share property
equally. In addition, Lee had never agreed to support Michelle
beyond their relationship, and the couple never decided she
should forego her career to care for him. The trial court found
that Michelle had not been damaged as a result of her relationship and had in fact benefitted, economically and socially.
Despite finding no support obligation and no unjust emichment,
the trial court ordered payment of $104,000 in economic
rehabilitation.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982

55

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 8

776

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:725

The award represented the court's belief that, equitably, the
woman was entitled to assistance allowing her to resume her career. The award was calculated by taking her highest previous
weekly salary as a singer, and multiplying this amount to cover a
two year period - the time estimated for rehabilitation. On review, the appellate court found the pleadings only asked for
monthly support and maintenance; there was no request for the
support awarded. Because the award was not within the issues
framed by the pleadings, the court determined that the trial
court's special findings were to be disregarded. The award was
found to be without factual basis and was deleted.
The court of appeal noted that under Rosenburg v. Lawrence, 10 Cal. 2d 590, 75 P.2d 1082 (1938), a substantive right
cannot be created in equity without some underlying obligation.
The court concluded an award was not warranted absent a showing of expectation or obligation. Since the trial court found
neither factor, the award was withdrawn.

J.

LEGISLATION

1. Marriage and Dissolution

A.B. 233 - Deddeh
Chapter 326
Statutes of 1981
Innocent Spouse Protected From Tax Liability. This legislation
operates to protect an innocent spouse where the tax return of a
couple contains either an omission or incorrect deduction attributable to one spouse. Under this amended version of Revenue
and Taxation Code section 18402.9, if a spouse can establish
that he or she had no knowledge of a mistake from which the
other spouse will benefit, the innocent spouse is not liable for
back taxes, penalties or interest. The issue of knowledge depends upon the question of whether the innocent spouse had
reason to know of the other spouse's mistake. Only those tax
years which are not subject to res judicata and the statute of
limitations are affected by this legislation.
A.B. 1580 - Herger
Chapter 327
Statutes of 1981
Gifts to Commissioner of Civil Marriages. Under Penal Code
Women's Law Forum
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section 70.5, it is a misdemeanor for a commissioner of civil marriages to accept money or gifts for performing a marriage, other
than the amount set as a fee. This law amends the section to
allow a commissioner to accept money on weekends and
holidays.
S.B. 1199 - Marks
Chapter 715
Statutes of 1981
Changes in Family Law Act. Civil Code section 4370 was
amended to allow a court to order any party to a dissolution
proceeding, except a governmental entity, to pay the costs of the
suit and attorney fees. Further, the new language indicates that
the court may award a sum, subject to modification, even after
appeal is final.
Civil Code section 4800.6, which had required an attorney to
give notice to the parties that both spouses would be responsible
to creditors despite the court's distribution of a claim to one
spouse, was repealed and replaced with legislation incorporating
the same notice into the interlocutory decree of dissolution, or
the final judgment of separation.
An amended version of section 4811 of the Civil Code added
subdivision (d). Section (d) applies to agreements in which parties provide for child and spousal support, but fails to indicate
specific amounts for each. The total support amount will not be
categorized by the courts, but will be known as 'family support.'
2. Child Custody

A.B. 344 - Thruman
Chapter 810
Statutes of 1981
Investigation Required to Terminate Parental Rights. A juvenile probation officer is required to investigate the home life of a
minor involved in a Civil Code section 232 parental termination
suit. The amended version of section 232 requires that the officer's report contain: (1) a statement explaining the action; (2) a .
statement addressing the minor's feelings about the action; (3) a
report on the minor's relationship with the parents; (4) a statement that the minor has been informed of his or her right to
attend the termination hearing; and (5) based on the minor's
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age, any exception to these requirements.
The amendment to section 234 lowers the age at which a
minor is forced to appear before the court in a parental termination proceeding. This section reduces the age from twelve to ten.
In addition, an amendment to Civil Code section 237.5 gives
the court authority to appoint counsel for both parents and children, regardless of their ability to pay. However, a court cannot
appoint the same counsel for both parties.

3. Child Support
A.B. 84 - McAlister
Chapter 528
Statutes of 1981
Limitation on Pension Exemption. This section further limits
the pensions exceptions from the execution of child support orders. The legislature substituted the phrase "judgment or order
for" in place of "court ordered" in section 690.18 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, section 22005 of the Education Code and Government Code section 21201, thus providing procedure through
which support orders are more readily enforced.

4. Spousal Support
S.B. 1019 - Greene
Chapter 927
Statutes of 1981
Consideration of Medical Insurance in Support Award. Section
4706 was added to the Civil Code to allow a judge to consider
medical insurance coverage in an action for spousal support.
Section 1149, added to the Welfare and Institutions Code, allows
for medical insurance information where child support is ordered. Under these sections, the supporting party must fill out a
state medical insurance form at a judge's request.
A.B. 2135 - Konnyu
Chapter 514
Statutes of 1981
Factors in Awarding Spousal Support. Civil Code section 4801
was amended to require court consideration of several factors in
determining the amount of spousal support to be awarded in a
Women's Law Forum
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dissolution proceeding. Among the new factors are: the amount
of time the supported spouse will need to be trained or educated
in order to be' employed; the age of the parties; and the parties
accustomed standard of living. Upon motion and a showing of
good cause, the court may also order a spouse to undergo examination by a vocational training consultant (VTC). A VTC is an
individual trained with a specialized knowledge in the area of
career formulation and planning.

5. Pregnancy
A.B. 267 - McAlister
Statutes of 1981
Regulation of Wrongful Life Cause of Action. In response to
Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811,
165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (2d Diet. 1980), where a genetically damaged
child's cause of action for wrongful life was created, the legislature added section 43.6 to the Civil Code. Section 43.6 prohibits
a suit by a child against hie or her parents on the grounds that
conception should not have taken place or that the child should
not have been born. Also, under this section a third party may
not assert as a defense or reason to reduce any damage award
that a child should have been aborted by his or her parents.

6. Paternity
A.B. 123 - Stirling
Chapter 266
Statutes of 1981
Admissibility of HLA Blood Tests. This bill amends section 895
of the Evidence Code. Human leococyte antigen (HLA) tests will
be used to prove paternity if experts disagree over the question
of paternity, or if blood tests show a probability that the male is
the father. The issue will then be submitted to the court, including evidence based on HLA tests. Previously, this section allowed for submission upon all the evidence only, excluding the
results of the HLA test.
A.B. 207 - Stirling
Chapter 1180
Statutes of 1981
Use of Blood Tests to Rebut Paternity Presumption. Evidence
Code section 621 conclusively presumes a child bom while hus-
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band and wife are cohabitating to be the husband's where the
husband is not sterile or impotent. This section was amended to
allow the mother to rebut this presumption by moving for blood
tests within two years of the child's birth if the child's biological
father has filed an affidavit acknowledging paternity.
III. TORT LAW
A.

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

1. Recovery For Death of Fetus

Johnson v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 177 Cal.
Rptr. 63 (2d Dist. 1981). A mother who had sensorily experienced the death of her stillborn fetus could claim emotional distress along with personal injury, according to the court of appeal. The court found that a stillbirth can foreseeably cause
emotional injury which would be compensated as part of a
mother's medical malpractice claim.

The woman was in labor for twenty-four hours. The attending physician refused to perform a Caesarean, despite the woman's request. The fetus died in the womb.

An action was filed pleading two causes of action: Medical
malpractice, and negligent infliction of emotional distress, based
upon the fetus' death. A demurrer to the latter cause of action
was sustained without leave to amend. The woman appealed.
The court of appeal ordered the trial court to allow the woman to amend her first cause of action for personal injuries to
include damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The ruling was based on an application of Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.
2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968), in which the California Supreme Court established a cause of action for emotional distress for a parent witnessing the tortious death of his
or her child.
In Dillon, the court stated there were several essential elements to a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress: (1) the plaintiff and the victim must be closely related;
(2) the plaintiff must be present at the scene of the accident;
and (3) the shock to the plaintiff must result from the plaintiff's
sensory perception of the injury to the victim. The court of apWomen's Law Forum
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peal noted that the woman sensorily felt the death of her child
and that despite the fetal nature of the child, the woman had a
relationship which met the Dillon requirement.
The court emphasized the presence of a relationship be-·
tween the mother and fetus in this case, and the foreseeability
that emotional distress will result if the fetus' death is caused by
medical malpractice.
B. DuTY

TO PROTECT FROM RAPE

1. Landlord's Duty to Protect Tenants Found Where
Danger Foreseeable

Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 324,
176 Cal. Rptr. 494 (lst Dist. 1981). Landlords who, despite notice of past criminal activity on their premises, failed to take
preventive measures to protect tenants from repeated crimes
were held liable for injuries resulting from a rape. The court of
appeal held that a landlord has a duty to protect tenants from
danger where circumstances make criminal activity likely, and
that rape is foreseeable in some instances.

The tenant lived in a building located in a high crime area.
The building lobby was accessible only to tenants, but due to a
defective front door lock, non-residents could enter. On two
prior occasions tenants had been mugged in the building. The
victim had personally notified the landlord of unsafe conditions
one month before her attack. Despite acknowledging the problem, the landlord failed to take preventative measures. The tenant was raped and robbed in the building's lobby.
The trial court sustained the landlord's demurrer without
leave to amend. The court of appeal reversed, applying O'Hara
v. Western Seven Trees Corp., 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal.
Rptr. 487 (1st Dist. 1977), which held that while common law
principles hold a landlord free of a duty to protect tenants, such
a duty arises where the landlord has notice of criminal activities
taking place upon the property.
Here, the landlords had substantial notice of criminal activity on their property, yet failed to repair door locks and lighting.
The court found that the danger of rape, in particular, was fore-
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seeable despite the fact the two previous incidents had been robberies. The court noted that rape, like robbery, is a form of assault, and that the landlords had notice of assaults. In addition,
the court pointed out that foreseeability does not require identical events, other jurisdictions have held a landlord liable for a
first time criminal attack.
2. Duty of Landlord to Protect Tenant From Rape Not
Found
7735 Hollywood Blvd. Venture v. Superior Court, 116 Cal.
App. 3d 901, 172 Cal. Rptr. 528 (2d Dist. 1981), hearing denied,
July 13, 1981. The court of appeal dismissed a rape victim's
cause of action for negligence against her landlord. The landlord's duty to protect the woman against criminal assault was
not established. Absent notice of past crimes on the premises, or
reason to anticipate crime, a landlord has no duty to protect tenants from harm, said the court.

A woman was raped in her apartment. She sued the landlord, alleging that because the landlord knew a rapist was operating in the general area, his failure to provide adequate lighting
to protect tenants against rape was negligence. The trial court
had overruled a demurrer. The court of appeal reversed, order~
ing the trial court to vacate its ruling.
The court of appeal noted that the woman's complaint
failed to indicate a crime had previously occured on the property, detail the specific areas where the rapes had occured or
support her claim that the landlord had notice of rapes in the
area. Under Totten v. More Oakland Residential Housing, Inc.,
63 Cal. App. 3d 538, 134 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1976), a landlord is not
an insurer of his or her property.
3. Landlord Not Liable For Tenant's Rape
Riley v. Marcus, 125 Cal. App. 3d 103, 177 Cal. Rptr. 827
(2d Dist. 1981). The court of appeal held that a landlord is not
liable for injuries to a tenant resulting from inadequate protection of the premises absent notice of previous criminal activities
on the property, or reason to anticipate such activities.

A woman was raped in her apartment by an intruder who
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gained entry because of inadequate security. Louvered windows
adjacent to her door made his entry possible. The area around
the tenant's apartment was totally dark after 1:30 a.m.
The tenant sued the landlords for negligence, alleging their
failure to keep the apartment complex safe resulted in her rape.
The tenant appealed the landlord's grant of summary judgment.
In O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp., 75 Cal. App. 3d
798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977), the court of apperu held that a
landlord with notice of previous crimes on the property had an
affirmative duty either to warn tenants, or provide necessary security where such incidents were likely to reoccur.
This same duty was found to exist in Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 324, 176 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1st
Dist. 1981), based upon similar facts. However, in 7735 Hollywood Boulevard Venture v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 3d
901, 172 Cal. Rptr. 528 (2d Dist. 1981), hearing denied, July 13,
1981, the court found a landlord had no duty to protect tenants.
In this case, there was no evidence of recent or similar
crimes on the property. The tenant argued, however, that the
landlord had attempted to provide security but had done an inadequate job. Because the landlord had made a representation
of safety by providing locks and lights, the tenant argued liability existed for a failure to protect the tenant from attack. However, the court found that locks and lights are not representations of safety.
4. Rape of Female Security Guard Not Foreseeable
Wingard v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 123 Cal. App. 3d 37, 176
Cal. Rptr. 320 (3d Dist. 1982). The court of appeal held that an
owner/contractor does not have a duty to protect a female security.guard from sexual assault. Because no similar criminal assaults had occured on the property, the owner could not have
reasonably foreseen this particular type of injury.

Wingard was employed by an agency that had contracted
with the owner to protect a warehouse from theft. While on duty
in the guardhouse, she was attacked by an intruder and raped.
There had been no previous history of violent crimes committed
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on the property, only some thefts.
The woman sued the owner and contractor alleging negligence in their failure to secure the premises against intruders.
The victim's employer had written the owner asking that the
guardhouse be moved.
The trial court dismissed the victim's action and granted
summary judgment based upon the absence of a duty on the
part of the owner and an extension of the fireman's rule. The
fireman's rule prohibits recovery under the theory that a
firefighter or police officer voluntarily confronts danger and is
compensated accordingly through his or her salary.
The court of appeal affirmed but declined to extend the fireman's rule to· security guards. Under Jamison v. Mark C.
Bloome, 112 Cal. App. 3d 570, 169 Cal. Rptr. 399 (2d Dist. 1980),
absence of a prior history of specific criminal activities on the
premises precluded a landlord's liability for failure to anticipate
that a security guard would be raped, where the only previous
criminal activity bad been theft.
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